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IT is widely accepted that the inter-German border was constructed byEast German authorities to halt the emigration to the west, which haddamaged the East German economy and undermined the East German
state agencies’ power.1 This article argues that this is an inaccurate understanding,
which mistakenly treats perceptions and insights gained from studying the Berlin
Wall as representative of the mostly rural border between East and West
Germany. It emphasizes crucial transformations of frontier society during the
1950s, highlighting the important role of western as well as eastern policy in
shaping them.
Cold-War perceptions and the captivating imagery of the Berlin Wall have for
many years overdetermined the history of German division. For twenty-eight
years, until November 1989, Berlin had been the most important icon of the Cold
War, and the fall of the Berlin Wall remains the best-known marker of its end.2 It
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is nowonder, then, that scholars have studied the BerlinWall more extensively than
any other part of the inter-German border as the symbol for the division of
Germany.3
Following Peter Sahlins, this article emphasizes the interrelations between
processes of border formation and state building. Sahlins studied the evolution
of the border between Spain and France as a process of state building and
demonstrated that political borders can give rise to parallel changes in identi-
fication patterns. His work has inspired the study of other borders and
periods, but until recently has had little effect on the study of the inter-
German border.4 Besides fences, walls, mines, bunkers, and watchtowers,
our knowledge about the inter-German border outside Berlin has been
limited to government decisions and their enforcement, and, of course, to
dramatic escape attempts. After the collapse of the border in 1989, a stream
of memoirs and personal narratives emerged, opening a window to the
experiences of life along the border.5 In the past decade, scholars have
begun to analyze dimensions of social and cultural transformation involved
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in border construction more systematically. Such studies question many aspects
of the historical perception of this border and are gradually transforming it.6
Studying the interlaced effects of state building and border formation preced-
ing the construction of the Berlin Wall, this article contributes to this trend by
demonstrating that the division of Germany was well under way by 1961,
driven significantly by western policies and initiatives. The article contends that
scholars have not assigned sufficient causality to these processes because of the
greater drama and visibility of events in Berlin. Despite the very important con-
tribution of these processes to the division of Germany, they remain, in other
words, “hidden behind the Wall.”
The BerlinWall was constructed in August 1961 by the Soviet-backed govern-
ment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), primarily to stop East
Germans from moving to the west.7 Viewing the history of the entire inter-
German border as having been constructed for similar causes fitted Cold-War
ideological battles. It was easy to uphold this view because the visible, physical
construction of the border was mostly initiated by East Germany.8 Such
6For some of the most recent works, see Maren Ullrich, Geteilte Ansichten. Erinnerungslandschaft
deutsch-deutsche Grenze (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2006), which analyzes memorial culture along the
inter-German border through the years of division and unification. Sheffer, “Burned Bridge,” is an
extremely rich micro-study of the development of this border between two towns that emphasizes
the agency of frontier residents in this process. The first publication out of this excellent dissertation
was Edith Sheffer, “On Edge: Building the Border in East and West Germany,” Central European
History 40 (2007): 307–339. As this article is being prepared for print, the book based on her disser-
tation is scheduled to appear in several months. See Edith Sheffer, Burned Bridge: How East and West
Germans Made the Iron Curtain (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2011). Astrid M. Eckert of
Emory University is working on a project to analyze different aspects of West German state and
nation building as they took place along the inter-German border. She began this project with an
investigation of border tourism in the FRG. See Astrid M. Eckert, “‘Greetings from the Zonal
Border’”: Tourism to the Iron Curtain in West Germany,” Zeithistorische Forschung/Studies in
Contemporary History 8, no. 1 (2011): 9–36. Jason Johnson is preparing a dissertation at
Northwestern University with the working title “Dividing Mödlareuth: The Incorporation of Half
a German Village into the GDR Regime, 1945–1989.” These projects, and my own, owe a lot to
the late Daphne Berdahl’s fascinating anthropological study of the village of Kella in the transformative
years of German unification. Daphne Berdahl, Where the World Ended: Reunification and Identity in the
German Borderland (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1999). See also the
report from a recent workshop on the history of the inter-German border that brings together some of
the people mentioned above and others and suggests that the transformation of perspective in studying
the inter-German border is gathering momentum: Tagungsbericht Grenze—Konstruktion Realität
Narrative, June 24–26, 2010, Hannover, in H-Soz-u-Kult, July 28, 2010, http://hsozkult.
geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=3213.
7See Thomas Lindenberger, “Diktatur der Grenze(n). Die eingemauerte Gesellschaft und ihre
Feinde,” in Mauerbau und Mauerfall, ed. Hertle, Jarausch, and Kleßmann, 203.
8See an example of assigning all the initiative in the division of Germany to the east based on
looking at the most visible steps and interpreting them as having exclusively internal eastern causes
in Thomas Lindenberger, “‘Zonenrand,’ ‘Sperrgebiet’ und ‘Westberlin.’ Deutschland als
Grenzregion des Kalten Kriegs,” in Teilung und Integration. Die doppelte deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte
als wissenschaftliches und didaktisches Problem, ed. Christoph Kleßmann and Peter Lautzas (Bonn:
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2005), 102–104.
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reasoning, though, confuses result with intention, ignores change over time, and
neglects to look outside Berlin. Through sixteen years after the end ofWorldWar
II, the social division of Germany and the physical construction of the border
between west and east progressed under different conditions and served different
goals. The first major physical construction of the border initiated by eastern state
agencies in summer 1952 was partly a reaction towestern policies. It was aimed, as
shown below, as much toward the west, in an attempt to force recognition of the
GDR, as it was toward East German citizens.
This article analyzes the impact of the western “claim to exclusive represen-
tation of the German people” (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) on the formation of
boundaries between East and West Germany. It shows that the western insistence
on diplomatically isolating the German Democratic Republic, with the declared
aim of preserving German unity, actually contributed to the emergence of phys-
ical and political demarcations as well as long-lasting social divisions. These
changes emerged gradually, not as a direct product of conscious efforts by any
one actor. The article shows how policies connected with the western claim to
exclusive representation and eastern state agencies’ reactions to it worked to
further the physical build-up of the border and to undermine regional, cross-
border coordination and identification.
The article establishes these arguments through the analysis of border-
crossing relations in a well-integrated region with a tradition of strong regional
identification, which was split by the inter-German border. The Eichsfeld
region in central Germany had been an enclosed Catholic enclave in a
Protestant-dominated region ever since the Counter-Reformation. It was
divided between Hanover and Saxony in the post-Napoleonic order, and the
borderline then drawn was adopted as the dividing line between two Prussian
provinces in united Germany. Eventually, with little change, this became the
demarcation line between the Soviet and the British and U.S. zones in 1945.9
Pre-1945 divisions of the region did not undermine the strong cohesion of this
regional community as evident by the thick kinship networks, regional organiza-
tions, pilgrimages, and celebrations that bound Eichsfelder and brought them
together across state and province borders.
The case studies analyzed in this article show how local politicians from the
West and East German parts of the Eichsfeld used shared traditions to circumvent
western authorities’ prohibition of official border-crossing meetings. Genuine
popular interest, local initiative, and massive participation created the opportunity
and gave rise to lively border-crossing cultural exchange. Western state agencies
9For details about the first division of the Eichsfeld in 1815–16, see Ulrich Hussong, “Die Teilung
des Eichsfeldes im Jahre 1815,” Eichsfeld Jahrbuch (1993): 5–92; Peter Aufgebauer, “Geschichte einer
Grenzlandschaft,” in Das Eichsfeld. Ein deutscher Grenzraum, ed. Peter Aufgebauer et al. (Duderstadt:
Mecke, 2002), 75–76.
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approved border-crossing visits and meetings that were couched in this context.
For several years during the second half of the 1950s, officials from both sides of
the border met and engaged in complicated negotiations. These local administra-
tors shared the wish to promote local economic, cultural, and other interests, but
they also served the interests and priorities of state organizations, which eventually
doomed their efforts. State agencies, engulfed in the battle over recognition of the
GDR, circumscribed the negotiations in ways that led to their inevitable failure.
This failure taught the administrators and frontier residents involved that the
determination of central state authorities to uphold dividing strategies was stron-
ger than the ties that bound Eichsfelder together.
All along the inter-German border, frontier residents and administrations came
together during the 1950s to seekways to overcome difficulties caused by the emerg-
ing border. Edith Sheffer analyzed a similar series of meetings and negotiations
between western and eastern frontier administrators in her dissertation, for
example.10 The general contours of the affair in the region she studied were quite
similar to those analyzed in this article: frontier administrators met and talked
throughout the period but could not overcome the dynamics of division. The analy-
sis of cooperation attempts in the Eichsfeld presented in this article demonstrates that
the regional border-crossing negotiations failed before the building of the BerlinWall
and their failure was not a result of changes in East German policy. I argue that the
dramatic changes of 1961 have concealed the effect of division processes during the
1950s and the less visible factors behind them.
This article contends that many players at many levels shaped the ColdWar. The
realities and the meanings of the Iron Curtain and the ColdWar were not produced
exclusively in Moscow and Washington. Nor did they grow entirely out of the
everyday actions of frontier populations. Individuals, families, and communities,
and all levels of state organizations from district and county authorities to states
and superpowers were involved in creating the Cold War. The division of
Germany and Europe transformed the lives ofmanymillions and radically influenced
the perceptions of generations worldwide. A major source for these momentous
transformations were the interactions between these different elements of society.
Along the borders of the Cold War, where West and East met face to face, inter-
actions between policies and practices of state agencies and citizens were most
intense. Borders were the production facilities for the mindsets, self, and other per-
ceptions and social structures of the Cold War—none more than the inter-German
border, which carved “East” and “West” out of a previously unified society.
This article shows that the western campaign to isolate the GDR made issues
related to its recognition a top priority for state agencies in east and west alike.
10Sheffer, “Burned Bridge,” 560–70. I thank Edith for first pointing out to me the similarity
between the two stories as I was working on an early version of this article.
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Considerations of recognition trumped potential benefits of coordination and
undermined cross-border contacts. Close supervision by central state agencies
devalued local and regional border-crossing communities, contributing to the
emergence of boundaries dividing a previously unified society.
The regional negotiation attempt analyzed in this article demonstrates that in
the second half of the 1950s regional communities sprawling across the east-
west divide were still vital. The case presented in Sheffer’s dissertation further sup-
ports this finding. In both cases, local administrators easily found ways to contact
each other and engaged one another willingly. Popular opinion in their districts
favored border-crossing meetings and cooperation. In both cases, too, the nego-
tiations failed to achieve progress and resolve any issues of substance because of the
limitations imposed by superior state agencies. These similar lines of development
highlight the limits of agency of frontier residents in the process of division. State
agencies dictated very rigid rules regarding border-crossing contacts. Even when
frontier administrators openly pushed against these rules and enjoyed popular
support, state agencies remained immovable. Demonstrating this, the article
argues that crucial elements in the historical transformation of German division
have not been accounted for as of yet. It shows, further, that West German pol-
icies, specifically, were more causal in bringing about division than realized in pre-
vious studies.
To explain how inter-German contacts came to be so severely proscribed
during the 1950s as to undermine cross-border communities in the Eichsfeld
and elsewhere, I turn first to a short history of the western claim to exclusive rep-
resentation of the German people.
Nonrecognition and its Discontents
The Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) claim to exclusive representation of
the German nation, embodied in the diplomatic battle against recognition of the
GDR, undermined cross-border coordination and contributed to the division of
Germany. Throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s, western and eastern state
agencies pursued goals dictated by the battle over recognition and legitimacy of
the East German state. The best-known front in this war was international diplo-
macy, but along the inter-German border daily battles werewaged on a less glam-
orous frontline of the same war.
The Origins of the Claim to Exclusive Representation
Allied policies had pushed the eastern and western parts of Germany apart since
1945, yet the Allies never officially abandoned their commitment to the future
reunification of Germany as written into the Potsdam agreement. The western
Allies’ rejection of the Stalin Note dated March 10, 1952, indicated that
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unification did not lie around the corner, however.11 Under Konrad Adenauer’s
leadership, the newWest German state made securing greater independence and
western integration its central goals, while also professing commitment to achiev-
ing German reunification. The early 1950s demonstrated how difficult it was to
form a coherent policy that promoted all these goals simultaneously that would be
publicly acceptable, diplomatically viable, and politically realistic.12 Within the
first half of the decade, the FRG reestablished an army and an armament industry,
became a founding member of the (west) European Coal and Steel Union, and
joined NATO. Partly in return, it gained growing formal independence from
the western Allies, which allowed the West German government to establish a
foreign ministry and diplomatic relations. The western Allies’ occupation of
West Germany formally ended with a treaty they signed with the FRG in May
1955. Throughout this period, officials of the federal government repeatedly
reiterated its commitment to German reunification. More than that, the FRG
was committed to a denial of Germany’s division. Adenauer and other govern-
ment officials time and again stated the claim to exclusive representation of the
German people, enshrined in the republic’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
According to this principle, “Until Germany was restored as a unified state, the
government of the Federal Republic—which alone had been elected in a free
democratic manner—would act as the sole legitimate representative of the
German people.”13 In practical terms, this meant that the FRG refused to deal
with the East German state or acknowledge that the territory beyond its eastern
border was anything other than Soviet-occupied territory.
The western Allies supported West Germany’s claim to exclusive represen-
tation of the German nation. After the establishment of the GDR in fall 1949,
they devised a strategy aimed at deterring any country from recognizing the
new socialist state and establishing relations with it. Bonn followed suit and
made the international isolation of the East German regime a cornerstone of its
11See Rolf Steininger, Eine Vertane Chance. Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952 und die
Wiedervereinigung (Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1985), 9, for a summary of the document’s
content. For many years, scholars and politicians in Germany and elsewhere debated the sincerity
of this suggestion and the reaction of the Allies and the German government. See Gerhard Wettig,
“Stalin and German Reunification: Archival Evidence on Soviet Foreign Policy in Spring 1952,”
The Historical Journal 37 (1994): 411–419. See also Wilfrid Loth, Die Sovjetunion und die deutsche
Frage (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 12–26.
12Werner Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR
1955–1973 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 14–15; Ludwig Auerbach, “Das ganze
Deutschland soll es sein,” in Adenauer und die Folgen, ed. H. J. Netzer (Munich: Beck, 1965), 92–105.
13William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany,
1949–1969 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 11–12. See also Kilian,
Die Hallstein-Doktrin, 18–19.
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foreign policy. The federal government announced that it would sever relations
with any state that would recognize “the so-called GDR.”14
The Soviet Union put this strategy to the test in summer and fall 1955, when
Khrushchev invited Adenauer to Moscow. The prospect of diplomatic relations
between the FRG and the Soviet Union raised questions regarding the West
German policy on relations with the GDR, but Adenauer’s government reaf-
firmed its standing on this point. Preparing for the visit during summer 1955,
West German policy makers decided to demand progress on German reunifica-
tion and to avoid any formal recognition of the GDR. They agreed that if the
Soviet Union’s leader wished to discuss diplomatic relations with the FRG, the
Germans would agree to establish committees to discuss the issue but not
more. During the visit in September, the Soviets refused to discuss reunification,
insisting that Adenauer should broach this question with the GDR leadership if he
wished. As the West German delegation was setting to depart in protest, the
Soviets made an offer: they would release the remaining ten thousand German
prisoners of war held in the U.S.S.R. in return for the establishment of diplomatic
relations with the FRG. The offer was politically too valuable for Adenauer to
pass up: returning the prisoners to their homes and families was bound to boost
his popularity. To the amazement of his senior advisers, Adenauer reversed on
their decisions in the preparatory discussions and accepted the offer. Before
returning to Germany, Adenauer submitted a letter to the Soviets stating the
FRG’s claim to exclusive representation of the German people and his govern-
ment’s refusal to accept the postwar borders. This was just a face-saving gesture,
not a negotiating move—Adenauer did not expect the Soviets to consent.15
Opening an embassy in a city that already hosted a GDR embassy, Adenauer
put the practice, if not the whole theory, of exclusive representation at risk.
How would the FRG be able to dissuade other countries from establishing
relations with the GDR? On the plane back, the top Foreign Office officials
began to assess their options given the new situation. The basic claim of the
new policy they formulated was that nothing had changed. Moscow presented
a unique problem and the FRG found a unique solution to it. The Soviet
Union held the POWs and was one of the war-time allies, all of whom had com-
mitted to German unity, so Bonn made an exception. In no other state in the
world would West Germany accept the existence of two German embassies. In
his press conference upon returning to Bonn, as well as in a Bundestag speech
summarizing the visit, Adenauer warned that Bonn would consider establishing
14To avoid using the title “German Democratic Republic,”West German speakers usually referred
to it as “the Soviet Zone” (Sovietische Besatzungszone, or SBZ) or “the so-called GDR” (die sogenannte
DDR). Some preferred “central Germany” (Mitteldeutschland), alluding also to the Germanness of the
territories annexed by Poland and the Soviet Union that belonged to Germany before World War II.
15Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 30–37; Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, 13–18; Rüdiger Marco Booz,
“Hallsteinzeit.” Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1955–1972 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1995), 17–20.
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relations with the GDR an “unfriendly act.” It took a few more months before
the details were rounded into an official policy that was presented in a conference
to foreign ambassadors in Bonn. The official letter was signed by Foreign Office
State Secretary Walter Hallstein. All the elements in the diplomatic formula had
been used before, but this was the first repackaging of all these elements as an offi-
cial West German policy, which was thereafter known as “the Hallstein
Doctrine.”16 Despite internal and external criticism and a less than impressive
record, this policy held firm thereafter until the establishment of the CDU/
CSU and SPD “big coalition” government in December 1966.17
Exclusive Representation and the Inter-German Border
Such a policy, which denied the existence of a neighboring state holding much
power over the lives of millions of Germans, gave rise to many contradictions.
Eastern state agencies were present and their practices visible, and western state
agencies’ insistence on ignoring them forced both sides into corners. In no area
were such problems clearer or more significant to the lives of German citizens
than in West German border policy and its implementation. Policies related to
exclusive representation and the ensuing battles over recognition of the GDR
hampered frontier residents’ ability to overcome some of the negative effects of
German division. Convinced that they were paying the price for Bonn’s unreal-
istic positions, western frontier residents criticized and occasionally subverted
their state’s policies.18
Even before the Hallstein Doctrine was formulated, theWest German claim to
exclusive representation of the German people had turned the recognition of the
GDR into the crux of the diplomatic battle between the two German states. The
western Allies and the West Germans were dependent on cooperation with
the Soviets for many things (such as ground travel from West Germany to
West Berlin). In May 1952, the East Germans and the Soviets increased this
dependency and used it in an attempt to force the west to recognize the GDR
at least de facto. On the morning of May 27, 1952, the GDR announced a
16Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 37–40; Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, 18–23; Booz, “Hallsteinzeit,”
17–19.
17Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 193–198; Kilian, Die Hallstein-Doktrin, 339–340; Booz,
“Hallsteinzeit,” 97–104. As a unique phenomenon in international relations, the Hallstein Doctrine
was analyzed and studied by many. The three books quoted above, published in the space of eight
years, summarize well its inception, different practices, difficulties, effects, and eventual demise.
See also Martin H. Geyer, “Der Kampf um nationale Representation. Deutsch-deutsche
Sportbeziehungen und die ‘Hallstein Doktrin,’” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgschichte 44 (1996): 55–86.
18Edith Sheffer recounts the story of border-crossing relations between Sonneberg andNeustadt bei
Coburg in the 1950s. The district administrator of the eastern district was fired in 1958 for agreeing to
discuss issues of content with his western colleagues, and the mayor of Neustadt decided to disregard
pressures from Bonn and continue with public official meetings with his colleagues from the east,
drawing much media attention in 1959–60. Sheffer, “Burned Bridge,” 565–68.
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dramatic change in border policy, declaring its border with West Germany offi-
cially impenetrable.19 This new policy included the abolition of all local and
regional arrangements allowing easy border crossing with renewable permits
for people who worked, studied, or owned property across the border from
where they lived.20 At the same time, many checkpoints along the border
were closed, and crossing the border became difficult and time-consuming.
The border was to be fortified by erecting a fence, clearing a ten-meter strip
east of the fence, and declaring a five-hundred-meter strip and a five-kilometer
strip as restricted areas with ascending levels of security. During the following
weeks, East German forces deported thousands of “untrustworthy people”
from the restricted areas into the GDRhinterland andmobilized or coerced thou-
sands of others to build fences and clear forests along the border.21 The govern-
ment instructed district and community councils to notify the population that
crossing the control strip along the border was absolutely prohibited for all.
The order further stated that “the border police received instructions [that] in
cases of nonobservance of the orders of border patrols, weapons should be
used.”22 The visibility and impact of GDR state agencies along the border had
increased manifold overnight, and frontier residents were forced to come to
terms with them.
19For preparations to the announcement of the new border regime in the GDR, beginning in early
May, see BAMA, DVH 27 Pt7493. For the purposes of the argument in this paper, see especially 50,
63–67. See also Besondere Massnahmen an der D-Linie,Weimar, May 3, 1952, in BAB, DO 1, 20.0/
642, for measures to tighten and even seal parts of the border as early as May 3. See a good step-by-step
document analysis of theweeks leading to the declaration of the new border regime in Inge Bennewitz
and Rainer Potratz, Zwangsaussiedlungen an der innerdeutsche Grenze. Analysen und Dokumente (Berlin:
Links, 1997), 26–33. For the broader context of this policy change in the GDR, see Ross,
Constructing Socialism, especially part 2 beginning on 51. For the Soviets’ instructions to the East
Germans as early as April 1952, see Lapp, Gefechtsdienst im Frieden, 19–20.
20These arrangements operated for more than five years at that point and are generally referred to as
“little border traffic” (kleine Grenzverkehr). All community councils received a detailed copy of the new
order stating explicitly that “Die Bestimmungen über den kleinen Grenzverkehr sind mit Wirkung
vom 26.5.52 aufgehoben” (the regulations governing the little border traffic are abolished as of
May 26, 1952). See, for example, KrAEich, Kirchgandern B14. This element was an important
part of the new border regime, and the central command of the border police worked on different
versions of its phrasings in advance. See BAMA, DVH 27, Pt 7493, 50.
21Edith Sheffer, “The Foundations of the Wall: Building a ‘Special Regime’ in the Borderland,”
unpublished paper presented at the German Studies Association’s Annual Conference, 2006, describes
in detail the effects of this new policy on the frontier population and references the major works on this
issue. See also Rainer Potratz, “Zwangsaussiedlungen aus dem Grenzgebiet der DDR zur
Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Mai/Juni 1952,” in Grenzland. Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutsch-
deutschen Grenze, ed. Bernd Weisbrod (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1993), 57–69; and the
very useful collection of documents pertaining to the deportation of frontier residents in the GDR
in Bennewitz and Potratz, Zwangsaussiedlungen. Different state agencies in the GDR wrote daily
reports on the implementation of the new border regime and the atmosphere along the border.
See, for example, KrAEich, EA HIG 192; ThHStAW, Land Thür. MdI Nr. 3039, 4–9; BAB DE
1, 6084, 178–179, 185–186.
22KrAEich, Kirchgandern B14. In practice the border police department at that time was under-
manned, under equipped, and not in a position to impose such regulation in a strict manner.
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At the same time, the Soviets notified the western Allies of a change in pro-
cedures for border crossing. German citizens wishing to travel into or pass
through the GDR were required from then on to have special permits issued
by the East German People’s Police. The Soviets proceeded to remove passengers
who did not possess such permits from trains crossing the border.23 Their unwill-
ingness to coordinate anything with a police force of a state they did not recognize
put the western Allies and the FRG in the difficult position of being unable to
ensure travel to Berlin for West German citizens. The new GDR border
regime in May 1952 worked in similar ways. Practices that were previously regu-
lated between the Allies or on the local level only, such as the operation of border-
crossing bus and train lines, had to be renegotiated with East German state
agencies. With the new border policy, the GDR created leverage for recognition.
On a daily basis, it produced thousands of routine demonstrations for West
Germans that it existed and had power over their lives, each of them an incentive
for these citizens of the FRG to support cross-border cooperation. The timing
was no coincidence. As Corey Ross has shown, 1952 marked a turning point
in the East German state-building project. Proclaiming its authority more
boldly, the GDR attempted also to force the west to accept it.24 This strategic
move raised the stakes of border policy on both sides, making the borderlands
a major battlefield in the German Cold War over the recognition of the GDR.
Cross-border contacts thus acquired explosive potential and state agencies on
both sides began to supervise frontier officials’ contacts with colleagues across
the border more closely.
Throughout the 1950s, frontier residents and local politicians, such as mayors
and district administrators, tried to find arrangements and mechanisms to enable
meeting the daily needs of frontier society in an environment greatly troubled by
the emerging political division. Administrators and politicians in frontier commu-
nities and districts were forced to engage the contradiction between their
superiors’ priorities, framed by diplomatic “all-German” strategies, and the
demands and needs of their communities and regions. Many local administrators
tried to make cross-border coordination work, knowing from experience that this
was an effective way to manage their resources and promote local interests.
Frontier administrators were very interesting players in this history, on the bound-
ary between state and non-state parts of society, often embodying the effort to
differentiate the two.25 Some frontier administrators were defiant of authority;
23McCloy to State Secretary, May 28, 1952, and July 2, 1952, in NARA-CIV RG 59 1311/250/
59/17/7/11/1.
24Ross, Constructing Socialism, 51. I argue that the transformation in GDR policy Ross discusses was
expressed in the clearest manner in the area of border policy.
25See Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,”
American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 77–96; and Gil Eyal, The Disenchantment of the Orient:
Expertise in Arab Affairs and the Israeli State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 7–8, 12,
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others toed the line more carefully. But regardless of the approach each took, their
initiatives for cross-border cooperation all failed. The battle over recognition had
pulled many cross-border networks and communities apart at the seams by
diminishing their relevance in daily life.
Exclusive Representation and the Demise of Border-Crossing
Cooperation
Policies related to exclusive representation created very rigid battle fronts between
the two German states, too rigid to allow coordination between officials on both
sides of the border to materialize in stable, productive relations. State agencies
stymied local efforts at cross-border cooperation, giving rise to repeated enact-
ments and experiences of division. Instead of promoting mutual interests and
solving practical problems, frontier administrators were forced into disputes
over the nature of the cooperation, technical or political, local or inter-state.
How Regional Identification Fell Victim to the Battle over Recognition26
In the Eichsfeld region, border-crossing cooperation had been the most common
way to address the challenges of local and regional administration and economy
before 1945. State and province borders had divided the Eichsfeld since the
early nineteenth century. These borders did not stand in the way of cooperation
on a local or regional basis. There was no physical obstacle in place and farmers
routinely cooperated to return stray cows, combat fires, or coordinate hunting
to minimize damages to agriculture. For these purposes, there was no difference
between cooperation among neighbors across the border and those on the same
side. The management and regulation of water resources presented the best
example of large-scale regional cooperation. Due to the topography of the
Eichsfeld, mountainous in the east and flat in the west, water in many smaller
and a few larger streams generally flowed across the border from east to west.
Regulating and clearing riverbeds was routinely carried out in coordination
between neighboring communities along streams, regardless of any borders.
108–119. For a development of the theory elaborated by these two authors regarding the connection
of the boundaries between state and society with the borders between states, and for an application of
this conceptualization to the history of German division, see Sagi Schaefer, “Ironing the Curtain:
Border and Boundary Formation in Cold War Rural Germany” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University,
2011), 34–38.
26Following Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, I chose not to employ the term “identity” in
this article. They suggest the use of “identification” instead because “As a processual, active term
derived from a verb [it] lacks the reifying connotations of ‘identity.’ It invites us to specify the
agents that do the identifying. And it does not presuppose that such identifying . . . will necessarily
result in internal sameness . . . Identification . . . is intrinsic to social life; ‘identity’ in the strong
sense is not.” Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,”’ Theory and Society 29
(2000): 1–47; quote on 14.
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When the town of Duderstadt (west of the border) needed to increase its water
supply in the interwar years, it turned to the neighboring community of
Brehme (east). An agreement was struck whereby Duderstadt purchased a
patch of land in Brehme where a deep well and necessary canals were dug to
lead the water to the town. No one thought much of the provincial border
between the two communities at the time.27
Cross-border cooperation continued to play an important role in the postwar
years until 1952 in the Eichsfeld, even as old administrative borders traversing
the region turned into demarcation lines between occupation zones and state-
building projects (see Map 1). The ease of cooperation in the Eichsfeld helped
Map 1: Map of the inter-German border marking the location of the Eichsfeld region. Source:
Copied and edited from Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, ed., Im Schatten der
Zonengrenze (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1956), 5.
27The project was completed in 1933. This arrangement became a problem and was discussed and
negotiated repeatedly on many levels from the early 1950s. See, for example, Verbindungen nach
Westdeutschland, die die Staatsgrenze berühren, Worbis, June 11, 1963, in KrAEich, EAWBS Nr.
7241.
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frontier residents overcome some of the problems created by emerging processes
of division. The arrangement reached among thewestern town of Duderstadt, the
farmers of the eastern village of Ecklingerode, and the eastern district of Worbis
provide a good example. Duderstadt agreed not to collect land taxes from farmers
from Ecklingerode whose fields were in its domain. In return, the farmers agreed
to pay these sums to the district of Worbis, which would use them to pay foresters
for keeping Duderstadt’s town forest (east of the border) in order and supplying
Duderstadt with wood. In this way, the individuals and state agencies involved
circumvented the difficulties posed by the conflicting regulations pertaining to
converting eastern and western currencies on both sides of the border.28 The
economy of these borderlands depended on many cross-border interactions
and arrangements of this kind to keep afloat in the years prior to 1952. But
even in the Eichsfeld, cross-border cooperation became increasingly difficult
after 1952, with state agencies on both sides gradually restricting contact
options, especially between officials.
The attempts to reopen the border checkpoint in the Eichsfeld demonstrate
how state agencies’ priorities prevented solutions to problems along the border.
The most important issue on the agenda for frontier administrators in the
Eichsfeld after 1952 was the quest to reopen the border checkpoint between
Gerblingerode and Teistungen. This checkpoint on the road from Hanover to
Erfurt, connecting Duderstadt with the eastern Eichsfeld, was the only one in
the region. It was closed as part of the GDR’s reform of border regulations in
May 1952, turning the road to Duderstadt into a dead-end road and thus severely
damaging the economy of the region. Appeals by the western Allies to the Soviets
to reopen the checkpoint were met with Soviet refusals to discuss matters falling
under the jurisdiction of the GDR. The Minister President of the county of
Hildesheim then notified the district administrator in Duderstadt that the govern-
ment authorized “local German administrations to discuss technical issues for the
reopening of border checkpoints” with their East German counterparts
(emphases in the original).29 With this limited authorization, the district admin-
istrator in Duderstadt tried to engage his colleague inWorbis in a discussion of the
chances to reopen the checkpoint. The chief administrator in Worbis agreed in
principle to discuss it but repeatedly invoked his view that border controls were
state matters. He explained that there were issues of currency exchange,
28Correspondence on this issue, beginning inMarch 1951, can be found in ThHStAW, Land Thür.,
Ministerium d. FinanzenNr. 1397. See especially documents fromMarch 28, 1951 (KreisratWorbis to
Th. MdI), April 30, 1951 (internal memo Th. Landesfinanzdirektion). See also many other examples
detailed in the document fromMay 5, 1951 (inspection report of Th. MdF detailing the different local
and regional solutions).
29Oberkreisdirektor Dud to Regierungspräsident Hildesheim, Dec. 4, 1953, and
Regierungspräsident Hildesheim to Oberkreisdirektor Dud, Jan. 23, 1954. Both in KrAGö, LK
DUD Nr. 61. The quote is from the second letter.
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permits, and more involved in opening a checkpoint that local administrators
could not regulate themselves. Throughout 1954, the two exchanged letters
on the subject but the eastern administrator showed no intention to move.30
Culture is Safe: How West Germany Agreed to Border-Crossing Contacts
The cementing of the battle over exclusive representation after 1952 led West
German state agencies to restrict all cross-border contacts between officials,
fearing theymight be presented as proof of recognition.With increasing problems
in frontier economy and society caused by the political division and with the
proven potential of cross-border cooperation for solving such problems, frontier
administrators saw these restrictions as hindering their ability to perform their
responsibilities effectively. The district administrator of the rural district of
Duderstadt, the western part of the Eichsfeld, Matthias Gleitze, understood his
superiors’ reservations about such meetings, but saw cooperation with colleagues
from the east as the only way to promote some key interests of his district’s popu-
lation. Gleitze was a native of the Eichsfeld and an expert in Eichsfeld agriculture.
He was active in the Center Party and spoke publicly against the NSDAP, an act
that cost him the position he held in the civil service in 1933 but allowed him to
regain one in 1947. He was elected head of the district administration
(Landkreisdirektor) in 1948, a position he held until his retirement in 1967.31
In summer 1953, Gleitzewas personally invited to meet with his counterpart in
Worbis. He requested permission from his superior in the county of Hildesheim
to accept the invitation. He explained that he knew the GDR side was going to
try and score propaganda points if he led an official delegation across the border.
He then emphasized that despite the political risk, such a meeting would be
worthwhile because there were many burning local issues that could be solved
through cross-border coordination in an area such as the Eichsfeld, with six
hundred years of close relations. Among the issues he mentioned were the
reopening of the border checkpoint discussed above, but also permits to cultivate
the Duderstadt town forest which lay across the border, prompt return of straying
30Further correspondence throughout 1954 is in the same file, including a report from a surprise visit
of one council member fromDuderstadt inWorbis. Some examples includeOberkreisdirektor Dud to
Vorsitz. d. KreistagsWBS, Feb. 23, 1954; Vorsitz. d. Kreistags WBS to Oberkreisdirektor Dud, March
4, 1954; Aktenvermerk by Garre on visit in Worbis, Aug. 18, 1954. All in KrAGö, LK DUDNr. 61.
31Gleitze was born in 1902 in Seeburg, about five miles northwest of Duderstadt as the crow flies.
After retiring he served in the district council and in the council of the city of Duderstadt. He died in
1989, just three weeks before the border opened. For details about Gleitze’s life and career, see http://
de.academic.ru/dic.nsf/dewiki/930693 (last accessed June 27, 2010). Gleitze earned a Ph.D. in
national economy at the University of Rostock in 1927, after having written a dissertation about
the development of plot sizes in the district of Duderstadt and its consequences. On the front cover
of his dissertation, below his name and title, Gleitze added “from Seeburg in the Eichsfeld.” See
M. Gleitze, “Die Verteilung und Bedeutung der Betriebsgrössen in der Landwirtschaft des Kreises
Duderstadt” (Ph.D. diss., Rostock University, 1926).
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livestock, and permission for conversations between relatives across the border
fence.32 His passionate and calculated attempt, and his promises to avoid any over-
tures from eastern officials to discuss political matters, did not help. His superiors
gave this initiative a bureaucratic burial by stalling. At the council meeting in
Duderstadt, Gleitze explained his rejection of the invitation in these words:
To be on the safest side, I asked the [county] government whether it would
be possible [to go to Worbis]. They needed to consult the [Lower Saxon]
Minister of the Interior. It is quite clear that if I or a committee would
travel toWorbis, Leipzig radio broadcasts would say that there is a delegation
in Worbis today. That might be taken the wrong way here. Then we would
have a case of lower authorities going against higher authorities.33
Gleitze thought he needed explicit permission, and he read administrative
language well enough to understand that the county officials’ stalling beyond
the date of the expected visit was their way of rejecting his request.
The breakthrough in the impasse about border-crossing meetings in the
Eichsfeld began in the village of Holungen about 3.5 miles southeast of the
inter-German border (see Map 2). Holungen was the birth and burial place of
Hermann Iseke (1856–1907), regarded as the Eichsfeld’s “homeland poet”
(Heimatdichter). In December 1954, a local committee was formed in the village
to organize an Eichsfeld celebration for the upcoming centenary of the poet’s
birth. The village council wrote to the district of Worbis requesting approval
and support for the project.34 Party functionaries in the district asked for more
details about Iseke, probably to ascertain that his history and politics did not
conceal any unwelcome surprises, and they were reassured by the response.
The organizing committee was instructed to join the German Socialist Unity
Party (SED)-affiliated “League of Culture” (Kulturbund).35
After receiving a green light, the village cultural committee began preparing a
regional event, celebrating Eichsfeld traditions. The SED activists in the region
tried to add political overtones, events, and symbols to the celebration to highlight
the GDR’s success and strength. They also sought to tone down the religious
emphasis of the planned event. One of the major conflicts between the local
32Oberkreisdirektor Duderstadt to Regierungspräsident Hildesheim, June 1, 1953, in KrAGö, LK
DUD Nr. 61.
33Undated Kreistag protocol, KrArGö, LK DUD Nr. 61. This western policy prohibiting border-
crossing meetings between officials was not unique to the Eichsfeld. Edith Sheffer writes that Bavarian
officials forced city councillors in Neustadt to cancel meetings they had already agreed to participate in
at the same time. See Sheffer, “Burned Bridge,” 562–3.
34Rat d. Gemeinde Holungen to Vorsitz. d. Rates d. Kreises Worbis Dec. 20, 1954. KrAEich,
Holungen B58.
35The SED was the East German ruling party. For the letter with the reassuring details about Iseke’s
background, see Rat d. Gemeinde Holungen to Vorsitz. d. Rates d. Kreises Worbis, Feb. 21, 1955.
KrAEich, Holungen B58. See also Jan Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics
of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 229–31.
HIDDEN BEHIND THE WALL 521
committee and the district party chiefs was the giant electrically lit cross that the
committee planned to erect on top of the hill facing west, to be seen across
the border day and night, symbolizing the unity of the Eichsfeld. Eventually,
the event as presented in invitations sent to western Eichsfeld communities
and the district authority seemed benign enough to win the approval of West
German state agencies. It was not a political event but a celebration of shared heri-
tage, and Gleitzewas able towin his superiors over to allowing the participation of
western Eichsfeld residents, himself included.37
Map 2: Map of the Eichsfeld from 1984 showing GDR district boundaries. Source: Eichsfeld District
Archive.36
36I thank FrauRegina Huschenbeth, director of the Eichsfeld district archive, for allowingme to use
this map.
37See one example of the invitations to West German Eichsfeld communities and to the western
district of Duderstadt, titled “Eichsfeld Homeland Gathering, a Contribution to Peace and Unity”
(Eichsfelder Heimattreffen, ein Beitrag für Frieden und Einheit), in KrAGö, LK DUD Nr. 61.
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The eventual regional festival in Holungen on July 7–8, 1956, was a true
Heimatfest. Major highlights of the first evening included the unveiling of the
Iseke memorial, a torchlight procession, and the lighting of the cross atop the
westward-looking hilltop of the Sonnenstein. A bonfire was lit near the cross
and was “answered” by two bonfires from the hills of the western Eichsfeld.
The second day began with a public mass, and its climax was a pageant with
Eichsfelder from across the region in traditional costumes. The major events
attracted more than 10,000 participants from the region, including hundreds
from the western Eichsfeld. Western participants were requested to apply for
permits in advance and were forced to travel for hours through a remote
border checkpoint, but many apparently crossed illegally and joined the event
unregistered. The eventual character of the event was determined primarily by
the massive participation of Eichsfelder and emphasized the shared Catholic tra-
ditions of the region.38 Regional identification and the will to uphold the cross-
border community were still strong among Eichsfelder in 1956. Voting with their
legs and with the contents chosen for their Heimatfest, residents clearly expressed
their devotion to the idea of a unified Eichsfeld.39
Cultural Contacts and the Politics of Recognition
Gleitze, the highest-ranking western official present, reported no politically
offensive transgressions upon returning home from the Iseke festival. Yet, for
the council members from the host district of Worbis, inter-German politics
had nevertheless been part of the event. There are indications that around that
time, party circles in the GDR had identified regional culture in the Eichsfeld
as a potential tool in their quest to win western recognition. The secretary of
the district council sent four of his deputies to engage with the visitors and
especially with the politicians coming from the west. Gleitze was not averse to
38For applications to participate from the western Eichsfeld, see Oberkreisdirektor Kreis Duderstadt
to Vorsitz. d. Rates d. Kreises Worbis, June 11, 1956, in KrAGö LK DUDNr. 61. The same file also
includes the program of the event and some newspaper reports on it. See Eichsfelder Heimatbote, July 21,
1956, “Das ganze Eichsfeld—ungeteilt” as cut and saved in the district archive in the western part of
the Eichsfeld, KrAGö LK DUD Nr. 61. For more details on the contents of the celebration, the
number of participants, and the locals’ perspectives on its impact, see Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist
Nation, 229–234. It is hard to determine exactly how many participants came from the western part
of the Eichsfeld region. Palmowski relies on GDR newspaper reports and on locals’ memories to
say that there were as many as eight hundred participants from the west (230), but permits were
issued for only 250, who boarded buses and traveled the long way through Wartha. See Stadt
Duderstadt,Die Grenze im Eichsfeld (Göttingen: Verlag Göttinger Tageblatt, 1991), 16. The additional
participants must have arrived via shorter, unofficial, and illegal routes.
39According to Edith Sheffer, this was the case in Sonneberg and Neustadt at that time as well.
Officials and residents of the two border towns were overwhelmingly in favor of border-crossing
meetings and ceremonies; they voted for them when given the chance, held them in spite of repeated
reprimands and prohibitions, and still remember them fondly today. Sheffer, “Burned Bridge,”
564–68.
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their courting. Having finally acquired official approval for a formal visit in the
eastern part of the Eichsfeld region, he was quite happy to reestablish working
relations with his colleagues there. In his reports, therefore, he emphasized the
harmless nature of these conversations, which touched only on topics such as
returning stray animals, regulation of waterways, and warnings in cases of fire
along the border.40
The SED in the Eichsfeld used this event to plant the seeds for a concerted
effort to turn Eichsfeld cultural unity and tradition into an instrument of “all-
German work” ( gesamtdeutsche Arbeit).41 In fact, it had begun to move in this
direction even before the Holungen event. During fall 1955, plans were made
for a concert of the Heiligenstadt (in the eastern Eichsfeld) choir to perform in
Duderstadt (in the west). At the same time, the district of Worbis encouraged
the mayors of the three towns of the eastern part of the Eichsfeld region
(Dingelstädt, Worbis, and Heiligenstadt) to initiate a meeting with the mayor
of Duderstadt, the only town in the western part.42 The practice of initiating con-
versations with private visitors from the west and inviting them to public events, a
cornerstone of all-German work in the GDR, was also restructured to instrumen-
talize regional culture. In previous years, visitors were invited to private conversa-
tions with the mayor or to tour factories and schools and hear about the progress
in East Germany. In April 1956, the town of Heiligenstadt invited visitors from
the west to a lecture about “poetry in the Eichsfeld dialect” followed by a slide
show titled “our Eichsfeld.”43 By the mid-1950s, SED circles came to view
regional traditions, networks, and identifications as potential tools in their
attempts to persuade West German citizens that the GDR was a stable, peace
loving, and friendly neighbor state.
From 1955 to 1958, cross-border connections between district administrations
in the Eichsfeld supplied an arena for repeated enactments of the drama of the
inter-German battles over exclusive representation. The region’s common reli-
gion, traditions, and concerns served as opportunities for meetings and correspon-
dences between administrators. Both sides had many issues they wanted to
coordinate with their colleagues across the border. For residents of these areas,
40In his first report, he emphasized that in the conversations with his colleagues from the neighbor-
ing GDR district, they avoided discussions of any political questions (“unter Vermeidung aller politischen
Fragen”) and concentrated on this kind of local issues. See Oberkreisdirektor Duderstadt,
Aktenvermerk, July 12, 1956, in KrAGö LK DUD Nr. 61.
41Under this title, state and party officials, organizations, and citizens of the GDR were encouraged
to contact West Germans and persuade them of the peaceful, just, and moral way of the East German
state so as to win them over for the eastern positions in the Cold War. For examples of “all-German
work” in other frontier areas, see Sheffer, “Burned Bridge,” 342–45.
42See Rat d. Kreises Worbis an den Rat d. Stadt Heiligenstadt, Nov. 24, 1955, in StArHIG Rep II,
IA Nr. 560.
43See the invitation to the event in StArHIG Rep II, IA Nr. 560.
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which had turned into frontier lands, the inter-German border was not simply a
diplomatic, geopolitical issue. It had changed many aspects of their daily lives and
significantly hampered their economy. The most insidious was perhaps the
change in the region’s place on the transportation map. From a central location,
lying between highways and railways, the Eichsfeld had turned into a peripheral
end-of-the-road station after railways and roads were severed by the border. Bus
lines were canceled and the national railway company reduced—and in the west
canceled—service, even to the district towns. Transportation costs for private citi-
zens and businesses rose significantly, and people had to ride bikes or walk miles to
get to work.44 To keep negotiations going and entertain the hope that they
would lead to improvement in this situation, for example to the reopening of
the border checkpoint in the region, district administrators had to obtain their
superiors’ approval repeatedly.
Trying to justify his intent to maintain working contacts with his colleagues in
the eastern Eichsfeld districts despite the danger of being caught in political ma-
neuvering by the GDR, Gleitze prepared a list of twenty-three items that required
cross-border coordination.45 This list was produced for western consumption; he
did not show it to his eastern colleagues. Accordingly, it did not include any item
that might have been considered problematic in the west. On the contrary, in
addition to many items that both sides were interested in, such as coordinating
the containment of epidemics or fires, the list included items that interested the
west. The first two items were access to the Duderstadt town forest east of the
border and opening the border checkpoint between Gerblingerode and
Teistungen. The list also included the mutual regulation of rivers and water
sources, an important western interest, since the eastern part of the Eichsfeld
was mountainous and lay upstream from the FRG part and as a result controlled
most of the water sources. Permission was granted, and along with cross-border
visits of choirs and football teams, the year following the Iseke celebration in
Holungen also saw lively correspondence between the district administrations
44Extensive correspondence on both sides of the border deals with the effects on transportation. See,
for example, Oberkreisdirektor Dud to Regierungspräsident Hildesheim, Dec. 4, 1953, KrAGö, LK
DUD Nr. 61 (district administrator explaining to his superior that severing the border-crossing road
passing through his district town had turned the town into a “dead corner” on the map);
Besprechung über Bahnbuslinie 1200, Sept. 14, 1956, in StaADud, Fuhr 142 (administrators trying
to convince representatives of the national railway company to reactivate a bus line connecting
border villages). Kalikombinat Werra-Merkers, May 3, 1962, in BAB, DY 30 IV 2/12/73,
157–159 (changes in restricted zone regulations created transportation problems for this mining
company). See also Gemeinde Wahlhausen to Ministerium d. Innern, Jan. 26, 1946, in KrAEich
EA HIG Nr. 402/I (the damages to dairy farmers in frontier villages).
45After the event in Holungen, both Lower Saxon and federal offices wanted clarifications from
Gleitze. They did not mind cultural exchanges but wanted to know the aim of meetings with local
politicians that he planned. See memos in NLA-HStAH Nds. 50 Acc. 96/88 Nr. 705 and Gleitze’s
twenty-three-point document in KrArGö, LK DUD Nr. 61.
HIDDEN BEHIND THE WALL 525
in the eastern and western Eichsfeld and several cross-border visits by council
members and district executives.46
State Intervention and the Demise of Border-Crossing Contacts
Though West German county and state authorities were always aware of existing
contacts and negotiations and monitored them closely, they did not officially
involve themselves. They sought to control the content of border-crossing
talks without being in the room. When the district administrator from
Duderstadt, Gleitze, met the county Minister President from Hildesheim, his
superior, in October 1956, he found out that word of a planned visit of
council members from the eastern part of the Eichsfeld region in the district of
Duderstadt had already reached his superiors. The Minister President emphasized
how important it would be to avoid any political issues during this visit. He
thought it would be useful to open the first greeting of the visitors with a clear
statement that “in no way is this a political visit with political discussions, but
meant simply for the affirmation of good neighborly cooperation and the con-
tinuation of negotiations, bearing on completely apolitical local issues of local
government.”47
Eastern state agencies also tried to control these negotiations, but they sought to
direct them to lead to negotiation of more than just local, “technical” issues. They
wanted to have these interactions lead to recognition—at least implicitly—of the
GDR, and they also wanted to draw in higher-level state agencies. District offi-
cials from both sides of the border who participated in these meetings had to be
attentive to the broader interests of their states and play by the rules set by their
superiors if they were to be allowed to continue these negotiations.48
Back in Duderstadt after the meeting in Holungen, Gleitze did not waste time.
On July 12, 1956, three days after returning, he began writing memos andmaking
inquiries about the issues he discussed with his eastern colleagues, hoping to prove
46State agencies continued to supervise these contacts. The Lower Saxon Ministry of the Interior
sent a division head (Ministerialrat) to question Gleitze on his interactions with eastern colleagues
in February 1957. See Ministerialrat Nullmeyer to Oberkreisdirektor Gleitze, March 1, 1957, in
KrArGö, LK DUD Nr. 61. For a list of the official cross-border meetings and events in the
Eichsfeld in those years and a brief discussion of the optimistic atmosphere they brought, see Stadt
Duderstadt, Die Grenze im Eichsfeld, 16–18.
47The district administrator transmitted these instructions to the official who was to greet the visi-
tors. See Oberkreisdirektor Gleitze to Landrat Diedrich, Duderstadt, Oct. 6, 1956, KrArGö, LKDUD
Nr. 61.
48For the eastern administrators, whowere not elected but appointed by the ruling party, keeping to
the lines dictated from above was crucial for keeping their jobs and their chances of advancing. In her
dissertation, Edith Sheffer tells of the dismissal of an eastern district chairman who went too far in his
negotiations with his western colleagues and promised progress on substantial issues. Sheffer, “Burned
Bridge,” 565–66. According to Jan Palmowski, residents of Holungen were convinced that the sec-
retary of their district council had been fired because he had allowed the Heimatfest to take place.
Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist Nation, 233–35.
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his intention to solve some of the problems they asked him about. It was not as
easy as he had hoped it would be. One of the issues that the Worbis council
members asked him to address, which Gleitze was happy to help with, was an
exchange of land registry documents for plots around the border. In several
areas along the border between the two districts, Soviet and British occupation
forces swapped land in 1945. Consequently, many plots lay in the de facto juris-
dictions of communities and districts that did not own the land registries of these
plots. These communities, and both districts, thus could not charge taxes on these
plots or perform and supervise legal actions pertaining to them. Gleitze wanted to
deal right away with what appeared to him to be a simple matter. Within days he
learned that it was not in his power.
The head of the land registry office in Duderstadt replied to his memo, saying
that as of the previous year the Lower Saxon Minister of the Interior notified all
land registry offices that his office would undertake all exchanges of documents
with the GDR.49 Gleitze did not know that internal discussions between
federal and state offices in the FRG and negotiations with the GDR on this
issue had been going on since the late 1940s. Initially, all involved in the
west—from the county, state, and federal levels—did not object to exchanging
copies of land registry documents (keeping the originals so that in case of unifica-
tion they would have the necessary documents). But as the internal correspon-
dence developed, potential perils of such an exchange became clear. What if
the GDR used the documents so acquired to disown private landowners and/
or to force collectivization of land? In addition, would surrendering copies of
these documents to East German authorities not entail a formal recognition of
the division of Germany and of the GDR? By 1956, federal and Lower Saxon
state offices had decided that land registry documents should not be exchanged.
Because they needed some legal documentation for routine administrative and
economic practices, Lower Saxon authorities initiated the creation of new land
registries.50 Gleitze was forced to backpedal from his promise to take care of
this issue, but he did not give up his hope to promote local interests through nego-
tiations with his colleagues from the east.
Similar news came from the eastern part of the Eichsfeld region quite quickly.
Gleitze conveyed to his eastern interlocutors in Holungen the priority of discuss-
ing the reopening of the border checkpoint Gerblingerode-Teistungen. By the
end of July he received an updated response on this question. The chief district
49Leiter d. Katasteramtes an d. Oberkreisdirektor Duderstadt, Aug. 22, 1956, KrArGö, LK DUD
Nr. 61.
50Thewhole file NLA-HStAHNds. 50 Acc. 96/88 Nr. 705 is dedicated to this issue, documenting
more than a hundred pages of correspondence and memos from the years 1949–1958. See especially
DDR Minister für Aufbau to Regierungspräsident Lüneburg, Nov. 2, 1950, Bundesminister
für gesamtdeutsche Fragen to Nds. MP, Dec. 21, 1951, and Nds. Minister d. Justiz to
Oberlandgerichtpräsident Celle, Jan. 4, 1957.
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administrator fromWorbis,Werner Flächsig, wrote to him that he had the chance
to raise this issue with his superiors and that they were very positively disposed
toward finding a way to reopen the checkpoint. All that was required, he
wrote, was for Gleitze to get his government to come to the discussion table
and then official representatives of both states would be able to solve the
problem. The least he expected of Gleitze was to have the district council offi-
cially call the federal government to take up discussion with the GDR on this
issue. Gleitze replied politely a few weeks later, explaining that he could not
discuss any “political” issues. Contacts between the governments in Bonn and
Pankow were “a matter of highly political nature” (Angelegenheit hochpolitischer
Art), so he must refrain from even discussing this option and obviously could
not accommodate Flächsig’s request.51 Though they allowed the contacts and
negotiations, superior state agencies in both states had not changed their positions
on the permitted contents for discussion and kept a close eye on frontier admin-
istrators, severely limiting the possible goals and achievements in these
negotiations.
Other than creating a good atmosphere, the lively cultural exchanges, corre-
spondences, and meetings following the celebration in Holungen resulted in
only very modest levels of coordination. District administrators managed to
find solutions only to those issues that could be solved via telephone calls
between them or their aides, such as notifications in case of fire. But, tellingly,
district administrators had not managed to establish permanent mechanisms to
cooperate even in such cases. Coordination continued to depend on goodwill
and personal commitment. And when the more complicated expectations of
both sides were not fulfilled, goodwill dwindled.
The contradictions between the practical goals and the symbolic restrictions
were too great to overcome. They came to the fore during and after an official
visit of the Duderstadt district administrator and several council members to the
neighboring districts of Worbis and Heiligenstadt in April 1957. At the press con-
ference they held upon returning, the Duderstadt politicians spoke very highly of
their hosts and of the prospects for cooperation. According to reports in western
newspapers, the delegates also presented a list of issues that both sides agreed to
address in future negotiations. The list, as published in the newspapers, included
twenty-three items. It was identical to the list Gleitze had prepared for internal
consumption.52 No agreement was reached with the eastern Eichsfeld represen-
tatives on this list or any other. Whatever Gleitze thought when he decided to
make his list public—probably that it would help to make the public and his
51Flächsig to Gleitze, July 30, 1956, and Gleitze to Flächsig, Aug. 24, 1956, both in KrAGö, LK
DUD, Nr. 61.
52The newspaper stories were cut and saved at the district archive in the same file with the corre-
spondence. See KrArGö, LK DUD Nr. 61.
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superiors more favorably disposed toward his work—he must have realized
also that it would cause problems with his eastern colleagues.53 The twenty-
three-item list had been prepared for western eyes and excluded issues that
might have seemed “political” or undesirable to Gleitze’s superiors. It did not
include many items that the eastern negotiators repeatedly put on the table,
such as exchanging delegations of high-ranking officials. District officials in the
eastern part of the Eichsfeld region and their superiors in East Berlin read these
reports carefully.54 Gleitze wrote to Flächsig to say that he should not take the
reports too seriously. Flächsig replied that in his state, newspapers were taken
very seriously, and he protested that the report was wrong to say that his
council agreed with the western delegation on a list of issues to discuss.55
Gleitze argued that the journalists had misunderstood him, that they just
counted issues he mentioned as potential things to talk about and made them
into a title of a fictitious plan. He probably lied. The identical wording of all
twenty-three articles to those in his original memo suggests that he not only dic-
tated them to the journalists but probably handed out printed copies. This move is
significant because it testifies to Gleitze’s giving up on the chances of real progress.
His priority of good public relations in the west over good terms with his eastern
colleagues suggests that he sensed that a public-relations boost was the best thing
he could still achieve in these negotiations.56
During 1958, the two districts maintained their contact only officially; no del-
egations crossed from side to side, and correspondence included mostly the sub-
scriptions to local newspapers each district had arranged for the other. A clear
indication that the GDR decided to give up on leveraging Eichsfeld culture for
recognition came in the following year. The district of Worbis (in the eastern
part of the Eichsfeld region) attempted repeatedly in 1959 to establish working
relations with the border district of Eschwege in Hessen (west). Eschwege bor-
dered on the Eichsfeld and on the district of Worbis from the southwest but
did not share in the religion, traditions, or regional identification of the
Eichsfeld. The district administrator in Eschwege rejected all attempts from
Worbis to send an official delegation. Worbis did not relent and on two occasions
53Gleitze and his colleagues were probably under some pressure from journalists to justify the visit.
When they crossed to the east, entry was denied to the journalists who accompanied the delegation,
which did not help to make the media representatives favorable toward the whole affair.
54The story from the Südhanoversche Zeitung was typed word for word and saved in the district
archive in the GDR part of the Eichsfeld. See KrArEich, EA HIG Nr. 402/I.
55See both letters in KrArGö, LK DUD Nr. 61.
56Oberkreisdirektor Gleitze to Vorsitz. d. Rat d. Kreises Flächsig, Jan. 15, 1958, in KrArGö, LK
DUD Nr. 61. Edith Sheffer also suggests that press wars played an important part in border-crossing
meetings. She convincingly shows that as long as western city officials hoped to achieve pragmatic
progress in their negotiations, they were happy to keep them away from public view.When real prog-
ress was impossible, the border-crossing exchange turned into a press war. Sheffer, “Burned Bridge,”
567–68.
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sent a delegation anyway. The delegates crossed the border as private individuals
with permits and surprised the district administrator in his office.57 These tricks
may have gained the GDR some marginal public-relations points for trying to
establish cooperation between neighbors. But with no cultural exchange or
shared heritage on which to base cooperation, such maneuvers could not be pre-
sented as anything other than trying to achieve political ends. None of those
involved had any illusions about the chances of real border-crossing cooperation
arising from this affair.
Requiem: District Administrators Admit Failure of Border-Crossing
Contacts
In Duderstadt, Gleitze heard about the Worbis administrators’ attempts to force
Eschwege into official meetings and wrote to his colleague Flächsig. He wrote
that he was sorry to have dropped the correspondence between them for a
long time. After what had happened he thought that both of them needed to
negotiate with their governments to prevent high politics from interfering with
their quest to improve life in both their districts.58 The reply, which Flächsig
drafted and probably never sent, is fascinating. It holds an analysis of the inter-
actions of the previous years from the eastern side—the hopes, the chances,
and the frustrations. It explains well why eastern administrators took up these
negotiations and why and how they gave them up. Finally, it states the conditions
for resuming negotiations. The draft opens with an admission that Flächsig, too,
felt somewhat guilty that the correspondence between the two had lapsed. Then,
for more than a page, he refuted Gleitze’s version of why they had lost touch. He
did not think that they should both negotiate with their governments, and he did
not agree that they should prevent high politics from interfering in their nego-
tiations. On the contrary, he thought that they could promote none of the
issues that mattered to them without involving high politics. Their governments
should speak to each other and then all the issues Gleitze defined as “technical”
would be easy to solve on the local level. If the Federal Republic encountered
such problems along its border with Switzerland, he wrote, it would not look
to a district administrator to negotiate their resolution. It would send the
Foreign Minister to negotiate with his colleague across the border because inter-
state negotiations were the only way to solve problems between states. “I know
that you will answer me,” he wrote, that “the government of the Federal
Republic does not recognize the government of the GDR. Forgive me if I say
57Full reports by the participants of this delegation, including newspaper reports from the west, are
in KrArEich, EAWBS Nr. 2248.
58I did not find a copy of this letter. I deduced its content from the draft of the reply letter. See
Entwurf: an Oberkreisdirektor Gleitze, Duderstadt in KrArEich, EAWBS Nr. 2248.
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so, but this is becoming ridiculous. After all, the GDR exists . . . You cannot
simply ignore a full-blown fact.”59
Nowhere was the truth of this statement as clear as it was along the inter-
German border, where East German state agencies shaped crucial elements of
everyday life. Relying on their influence over frontier realities, functionaries in
the eastern part of the Eichsfeld region hoped that negotiating border issues
would force the west to recognize the GDR and that western negotiators
would understand they had to interact with the GDR if they wanted to
improve life along the border. Eastern politicians accepted lower-level local
meetings, assuming that the urgency of dealing with the situation along the
border would draw in higher state agencies. They lost interest when they
found that western insistence on exclusive representation was too rigid to allow
such developments.
In the second part of the letter, Flächsig hinted that while he personally did not
give up on the potential of negotiating with Gleitze, he had been ordered to
change course and was not in a position to do anything about it. He apologized
for the “strategic impoliteness” in going to Eschwege and not visiting Duderstadt
as well, and wrote that he could offer no explanation for it. He repeated the same
expression, “I can offer no explanation” (Ich kann keine Erklärung geben), several
times, suggesting that higher authorities were involved.60 But, he wrote, none
of this was intended to break off the existing relations with the district of
Duderstadt. To demonstrate this, he invited Gleitze and a delegation from his dis-
trict to visitWorbis again on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the establish-
ment of the German Democratic Republic. Flächsig thus made clear in this draft
that the only way for him to get permission to pursue again the relations with col-
leagues from the western part of the Eichsfeld region was to base them on formal
recognition of the GDR. By then, Flächsig understood Gleitze’s position quite
well. He realized that Gleitze would never accept this offer.
Even without receiving this letter, Gleitze must have known that the more
ambitious part of his efforts had failed. Beyond celebrating regional traditions
and dead poets, he had hoped to promote solutions for practical problems along
59Entwurf: an Oberkreisdirektor Gleitze, Duderstadt in KrArEich, EAWBS Nr. 2248. I have not
found a final version of this letter in either the western or eastern archives, so I assume it was not sent.
I think that it was too explicit regarding interventions from state agencies to pass censorship (see the
next footnote). This makes the draft even more interesting in my view. Flächsig had not simply reiter-
ated the formal version of his state (as in the reply regarding the border checkpoint quoted above), but
invested in clarifying the points.
60For example, he wrote that he could not offer any explanation for the fact that Gleitze did not
always receive the newspaper that Worbis sent him regularly. He wrote that he also did not regularly
receive the paper sent to him from Duderstadt, especially during the time of the Geneva Conference.
For that, too, he “could offer no explanation.” Flächsig knew very well that GDR secret services,
which monitored border-crossing mail, were responsible for the missing mail. He knew, too, that
they would read this letter, as well.
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the border. Hewanted to improve economic, ecological, and social conditions for
frontier residents. He realized that this would entail recognition of some German
authority east of the border and of its power to determine realities along the
border. For that he needed authorization from his superiors in state and federal
offices, but the authorization he received was limited and conditional. He was
instructed to avoid all those things Flächsig had been ordered to achieve. But as
long as Gleitze avoided “political issues,” Flächsig avoided discussion of “technical
issues.” They ended up avoiding all issues other than cultural exchanges.
Following the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, GDR state
agencies built increasingly ominous and sophisticated barriers along the rural
border as well. Triple fences, mines, and trip wires made illegal border crossing
more difficult. These barriers had not interrupted regional, cross-border
cooperation. State agencies’ obsessive pursuit of their priorities in the battles
over recognition of the GDR had already eliminated the potential to achieve
valuable improvement in the frontier economy and daily life through cooperation
by then. When eastern authorities realized that they could not use cultural
exchange to achieve recognition, they put a stop to all official contacts.
Exclusive Representation and Regional, Cross-Border Communities
Caught in the web of restrictions woven by the war over exclusive representation,
the two district heads had to give up their attempts to alleviate through
cooperation some of the difficulties created by the inter-German border. Each
side had to look away from the border, toward “its own” state agencies for solu-
tions to these problems. Frontier residents realized gradually that the hope of
turning the wheel back, enabling easy cross-border contacts, and renewing
social and economic interaction was not realistic.
The determination of the West German government to ignore the GDR,
together with the determination of the East German leadership to uphold its
border regime and use it to win recognition, precluded local and regional cross-
border cooperation for the first two decades of the inter-German border. Even
relying on the thick cross-border infrastructure of long-standing relations, shared
beliefs, kinship networks, and regional identification in the Eichsfeld, frontier
administrations could not overcome the growing division produced by the
battles over recognition. Cross-border connections on local levels never ceased
completely, but the scope of what was possible to achieve through them, and con-
sequently the drive to keep such channels open, narrowed significantly from the
late 1950s. Eichsfelder realized that all border-related problems should be
addressed to the governments of their respective states and would only be
solved within the two separate territorial jurisdictions. The well in the eastern
village of Brehme, which supplied water for Duderstadt since 1933, was neglected,
and the water flow diminished over years of separation. Unable to coordinate
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maintenance works with eastern authorities, Duderstadt was forced to turn west-
ward for help in finding alternative resources. By the late 1960s, the town was
ready to replace all the water from Brehme with western sources.61 Even for
their water, the two parts of the Eichsfeld were no longer inter-dependent.
As frontier residents’ daily practices and needs connected them ever more
tightly with eastern and western state organizations, their gaze turned gradually
away from the border and toward their respective capitals; their regional,
border-crossing communities and networks assumed an increasingly modest
place in their experiences and identifications.
Conclusion
Thewestern decision to isolate the German Democratic Republic internationally
made recognition of the East German state a prominent conflict between the two
German states. The smaller and weaker East German state sought ways to achieve
international recognition and establish commercial and diplomatic relations with
countries outside the Soviet Bloc. Its leaders understood that the key to this lay
with Bonn. Border policy was one of the instruments East German decision
makers applied in order to force Adenauer’s government to recognize the
GDR, at least de facto. East Germany’s closing of the border in May 1952
turned the inter-German border into a constant reminder of the existence of
the GDR and compelled many West Germans to deal directly with its authority.
Frontier residents especially were faced with the impracticality of nonrecognition.
Like Gleitze, many frontier residents and administrators expected western state
agencies in those years to negotiate the reopening of checkpoints, allowing
visits and trade, and much more. The story of the Gerblingerode-Teistungen
checkpoint in the Eichsfeld was typical of the fate of such causes.
Both German states were unwilling to risk understandings that might appear to
compromise their positions regarding recognition of the East German state in all
but the rare extreme cases during the 1950s and 1960s. In the mid-1950s, party
circles in East Germany harnessed regional identification and traditions in the
Eichsfeld in an attempt to secure western recognition. Fearing exactly that,
western state agencies instructed local politicians not to accept discussion of con-
troversial issues and avoid at all cost any formal recognition of the negotiated
problems as inter-state matters. Strictly keeping to this line, the western side
exposed the real motivations behind the eastern initiative.When they understood
that even implied recognition was not to be had, GDR party circles ordered the
local representatives to withdraw from the negotiations altogether.
Frontier residents knew that many of their goals, such as good education, clean
water, and preservation of regional traditions, could be at least partially achieved
61David Shears, The Ugly Frontier (New York: Knopf, 1970), 180–81.
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through stable cross-border coordination. They had been pursuing such
cooperation across administrative and state borders for centuries previously. As
shown in the example of Duderstadt, which relinquished land taxes and had its
woods tended to in return, border-crossing social and economic networks of
Eichsfeld residents were thick and effective in the postwar years.62
Priorities shaped by the battles over recognition of the GDR led eastern
and western state agencies to undermine most initiatives for institutional
border-crossing cooperation. To ensure local interests, frontier administrations
had to adapt to the rules and comply with the demands of these new, western
and eastern, state agencies. Frontier residents adjusted to the new rules, changing
their practices to maximize opportunities and minimize risks they gave rise to.
The accumulation of many such changes in orientation and shifts in practices
worked to weaken cross-border religious, kinship, and economic networks,
thus contributing to the process of German division.
Frontier residents and administrators had a much greater role in this process
than scholars have assumed until recently. Edith Sheffer’s work most clearly has
returned the agency of “ordinary Germans” to the analysis of the Iron
Curtain’s evolution. This article suggests that we should interpret their agency
cautiously. During the 1950s, there was room for initiative and action on both
sides of the inter-German border. In the Eichsfeld and elsewhere, frontier resi-
dents initiated border-crossing contacts and found ways to persuade state agencies
to allow them. But the initiative ran into the wall of state agencies’ obsession with
recognition. Many frontier residents expressed their wish to uphold their border-
crossing communities, demonstrating their still strong identification with these
communities. But policies related to exclusive representation and the careful
supervision enforcing them on frontier administrations denied frontier residents
the prospect of fulfilling this wish. Local agency was important in shaping life
along the border and the meanings attached to the border over time, but only
within the limits imposed by state organizations.
A key stage in the creation and solidification of the Iron Curtain was the cre-
ation of physical, social, and cultural distance between former neighbors, friends,
and relatives, and the gradual expansion of these distances. In the 1970s, the inter-
German border had eventually come to be the effective division of a nation and a
continent; ominous, controlled, and well guarded as its image suggests. Under
Willy Brandt, the West German federal government gave up exclusive represen-
tation and signed an official treaty with the GDR in 1972. In the following year,
the Eichsfeld checkpoint between Gerblingerode and Teistungen was finally
62This issue is dealt with in more depth in my dissertation. Schaefer, “Ironing the Curtain.” See also
Sagi Schaefer, “Border Land: Property Rights, Kinship, and the Emergence of the Inter-German
Border in the Eichsfeld,” in Praktiken der Differenz. Diasporakulturen in der Zeitgeschichte, ed. Miriam
Rürup (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009).
SAGI SCHAEFER534
reopened. It had been closed for more than two decades by then. In the mean-
time, division had become a stable experience. Regional and local problems were
solved, festivals were celebrated, riverbeds cleared, land tilled, and produce
bought and sold separately. East and west of the border, frontier residents had
found ways to pursue their interests within the frameworks created by “their
own” state agencies, and those states had become more “their own” in this
process.
There is no telling how border-crossing networks and identifications would
have fared had West Germany accepted the existence of a second German state
in 1949. When it decided to drop exclusive representation, these networks
were no longer as significant for the self-perception of most frontier residents as
they had been two decades earlier. A generation grew by 1973 for which “the
other side” was a foreign place. After the checkpoint was opened in the
Eichsfeld, some western youth occasionally went across it for the cheaper beer
and to enjoy the status of rich westerners. From the east only pensioners were
allowed to cross, and they came to visit relatives and friends or do some shopping.
Outside the family home, those who crossed in the 1970s and 1980s felt they
were visiting a foreign land.63 They were indeed foreign despite their religion
and accent. No longer part of the same viable regional community, they did
not share experiences, expectations, orientations, or interests. They had
become parts of two separate communities. The boundaries that emerged
between them have proven since 1990 to be more resilient than the political
and physical barriers that collapsed overnight.
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63See, for example, the story of a boy from Duderstadt on his first visit to the GDR in Klaus Lüdge,
“Reise vom Eichsfeld ins Eichsfeld 1971,” in Erzählungen von der deutsch-deutsche Grenze, ed. Cornelia
Röhlke (Efurt: Sutton Verlag, 2001), 84–85.
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